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LEGAL ESSAY
A CLOSE ENCOUNTER OF THE FIRST
KIND: ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
AND AN ENLIGHTENED JUDICIARY
by George P. Smith, 1I*
On July 19, 1977, Judge J. C. Testa of the Juvenile and
'Domestic Relations Court of Cumberland County, New Jer-
sey, had an original-and heretofore unreported-judicial
encounter of the first kind: a case of first impression, with
no standard of stare decisis for guidance or, for that matter,
security.'
C. C., an unmarried woman, conceived a child through
sperm artificially donated by C.M., a friend of some two
years. C. C. had considered artificial conception with other
friends, but C. M. suggested that he be the one to assist since
he and C. C. had often spoken of marriage. For some unre-
ported reason, C. C. did not want to have normal intercourse
with C. M. before they married. The parties consequently
consulted a doctor who in turn referred them to a sperm
bank. While refusing the couple's wish to use the facilities
of the sperm bank, the doctor-in-charge revealed to C. C. the
procedures used for achieving artificial insemination which
involve the use of a glass syringe and a glass jar.
C. C. made regular visits to C. M.'s apartment for the
express purpose of artificially inseminating herself. There
was no carnal connection involved. Rather, C. M. stayed in
one room and when he had completed producing semen, he
called C. C. and she, in turn, came from another room, ob-
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tained the semen, returned to a private room in the apart-
ment and proceeded to inseminate herself-artificially. After
a number of attempts, success was achieved and conception
occurred. No cohabitation followed.
Until about the third month of pregnancy, C. M. as-
sumed he would be allowed to act toward the child, when
born, in the same manner as any other father might act
toward his natural child. C. C. testified that during the pe-
riod of the pregnancy, C. M. was but a visitor in her private
home from time to time, as other friends were. The
"relationship" between C. C. and C. M. subsequently ended.
When the child was born, C. M. applied for visitation
rights. The issue before the court then became whether C. M.
was the natural father of the child since the sperm used to
conceive the child was transferred to C. C. by unnatural,
artificial means.' The resolution of this issue was central to
the determination of whether C. M. was entitled to visitation
rights as well as subject to the imposition of the co-ordinate
responsibility of child support and payment of expenses in-
curred in the child's birth.
The court, while refusing to take a specific position on
the propriety of the use of artificial insemination between
unmarried persons, ruled that public policy demanded that,
whenever possible, it was in the best interests of a child to
have two parents. Accordingly, the court held that as to
custodial and visitation rights, no distinction should be
made between a child conceived naturally and artificially.
C. M.'s petition was granted.3 The court, in recognizing C.
M. as the natural father, also recognized and imposed upon
him the responsibility to support and maintain the child.
Contrary to C. C.'s argument that C. M. was "unfit," the
court found him to be educationally and financially able to
meet his responsibilities and obligations of parenthood4 and
that he had a genuine interest in the child.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 825.
C. M. was, by profession, a teacher.
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Although the court did not find an exact case on point
for precedential guidance, it did look to and draw from cer-
tain related cases in order to guide it in resolving the di-
lemma of the instant case.
Even as to an illegitimate child, it has been established
that a natural father is entitled to exercise rights of visita-
tion.' In the instant case, the court rightly determined, with
relative ease, that despite the artificiality and "strained
uniqueness" of conception, C. M. was in fact the natural
father of the child conceived through C. C.'s use of his sperm.
The best interests of a child and the best interests of
society are served by preventing, or at least easing, the pres-
sures and taint of illegitimacy by determinations such as
those made by this enabled New Jersey judiciary. Although
the initial social, ethical, and religious repugnancy of the
procedure engaged in by C. C. and C. M. cannot be ignored,
the immediate welfare of a guiltless child and the economic
costs imposed upon society in raising that child must be
considered paramount and controlling. Finding legitimacy in
cases of this nature is the only equitable solution. By no
means should such a finding be taken as a legal, social, ethi-
cal, or religious condonation of the act of artificial insemina-
tion by unmarried couples. Rather, such a recognition of the
centralness of legitimacy as the over-riding issue here is but
a humane and enlightened legal response to an admittedly
distasteful problem.
Normally, in heterologous artificial insemination cases
(AID), the donor is unknown. The basic issues involve
whether the putative father, i.e., the husband of the artifi-
cially inseminated mother, becomes the real father of the
artificially conceived child.
As early as 1948, the New York Supreme Court held that
a woman artificially inseminated by a third party donor,
with her husband's consent, gave birth to a legitimate child.
The woman's husband was "entitled to the same rights as
that acquired by a foster parent who has formally adopted a
5 R. v. F., 113 N.J. Super. 396, 273 A.2d 808 (City Ct. 1971).
1978-79]
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
child, if not the same rights as those to which a natural
parent under the circumstances would be entitled."'
However, in Gursky v. Gursky,7 the New York trial court
held that even though a husband consents to his wife's use
of AID, the child is nonetheless, illegitimate. A more enlight-
ened and contemporary California Supreme Court in People
v. Sorenson' in 1968 rejected the Gursky thesis and went on
to hold that a husband who consents to his wife's use of AID
cannot disclaim his lawful fatherhood of the child for the
purpose of child support. The court construed a state penal
nonsupport statute to incorporate liability of a consenting
father of the AID child-finding a genetic relationship, as
such, unnecessary in order to establish the required father-
child relationship.9
In 1973, the New York Supreme Court appeared to have
obtained a far greater degree of sophistication in deciding the
case of Adoption of Anonymous. ,0 The Gursky decision was
not to be accorded blind precedential value. Rather, the
court found a strong state policy favoring legitimacy and,
further, that a child born of consensual artificial insemina-
tion by a donor, accomplished as such during a valid mar-
riage, is legitimate and thus entitled to enjoy all rights and
privileges of a child who is conceived in a natural way of the
same marriage.
Since the Sorenson and Anonymous decisions, several
states have passed legislation legitimizing the offspring of
AID when the husband consents to the procedure." These
Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391-92 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The Gursky court disap-
proved the Strnad court's conclusion.
68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968). See also, Smith, Artifi-
cial Insemination-No Longer a Quagmire, 3 FAm. L. Q. 1 (1969); Smith, For Unto
Us A Child Is Born-Legally, 56 A.B.A.J. 143 (1970).
Id. at 13-14.
74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CoDS § 7004 (West. Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN., § 74-
101.1 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN., § 23-129 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (Supp.
1977); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 73 (McKinney 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552
(Supp. 1977).




judicial and legislative developments indicate clearly that
both branches of government no longer equate AID with
adultery and may even signal the public's willingness to
sanction more startling genetic developments. 2
The basic reason for allowing a married couple to give
birth to a child by artificial insemination-the expression
and fulfillment of their love through procreation-does not
apply when an unmarried woman, who cannot assure her
child a normal, traditional family relationship, seeks the use
of artificial insemination. It was obviously because of this
social and even ethical prohibition, that the physician in
charge of the sperm bank refused to allow C. C. to use the
services of the sperm bank. Yet, the liberalization of certain
state adoption laws that now permit single individuals to
adopt children" and the growing recognition of the libera-
tion of women, present perhaps growing doubts relative to
the validity of the rationale of such a societal constraint.
A society that accepts the spirit of female liberation that
motivates women to conceive with no wish for formalized
family relationships or ties should allow a single woman who
does not conceive because of physical inabilities or profes-
sional interest to conceive with bioengineering techniques,
for example. The "So Long As It Works For You" philosophy
of the 1970's would embrace such a preference of a single
woman. 4
," Smith, The Medicolegal Challenge of Preparing for a Brave Yet Somewhat
Frightening New World, 5 J. OF LEGAL MED. 9 (April, 1977).
See also, Smith, Manipulating the Genetic Code: Jurisprudential
Conundrums, 64 GEO. L.J. 697 (1976); Smith, Through A Test Tube Darkly: Artifi-
cial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 127 (1968).
13 See N.Y. DOM. RE.. LAw § 110 (McKinney 1977); 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoption §
10 (1963).
," See Smith, Uncertainties on the Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and the New
Biology, 41 THE PHAROS 10 (1978).
Surrogate mothering, for example, will become a more troublesome problem
in the years ahead and demand legislative guidance. Already, there is a significant
demand for surrogates. The "normal" situation here is that a barren wife (whose
condition is normally caused by hysterectomy) still wishes-with her husband-to
raise a family. A surrogate is thus obtained and agrees to be artifically inseminated
with the husband's semen and carry the baby from conception to birth. Upon birth,
the married couple claims the issue as their own through adoption procedures.
1978-791
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Interestingly, although a new intellectual climate of
openness and reevaluation is evident in the Roman Catholic
hierarchy, this climate has not fostered new and significant
moral directions for the Church and its theologians in this
specific area of concern. 5
The official Church posture today remains the same as
it was first announced by Pope Pius XII in his address to the
Fourth International Convention of Catholic Physicians,
October 1949. The Pope stated that an act of artificial insem-
ination outside the state of marriage was immoral; so, too,
was use of a donor or third party's semen (AID) to facilitate
conception by a married couple. Such an act was to be
"rejected summarily." The Pope also rejected use of homolo-
gous artificial insemination (AIH), where semen derived ar-
tificially from a woman's husband is introduced into her
reproductive tract, for Catholic couples.'"
In 1951, the same Pope sought to amplify, and thereby
explain, his views relative to AIH. Accordingly, he expanded
upon his idea that the conjugal act was a personal act of
"simultaneous and immediate cooperation on the part of the
husband and wife." He continued by observing that "this is
something much more than the union of two seeds, which
may be brought about even artificially, without the natural
action of husband and wife." '' 7
The concern of Pope Pius XII over the manner of obtain-
ing semen in AIH is, today, no longer viewed by most moral-
ists as a valid obstacle to this procedure.'8 Indeed, when this
method of conception is the only method by which the
"procreative mission" may be met, pastoral counselors are
encouraged to suggest use of AIH.
Because of the possibility of malpractice suits, some doctors refuse to perform
artificial insemination. Yet "do-it-yourself" instructions are readily available and
easily effected. Witt, A Detroit Lawyer Finds Proxy Mothers for Childless Couples
Who Desperately Want to be Parents, PEoPLE WmKLY, June 12, 1978, at 71.
" See HUMAN SEXUALITY-NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN CATH-
OLIC THOUGHT (1977).
Id. at 137.
" Id. at 137, 138. (Address to the Congress of Italian Catholic Union of Mid-
wives).
" Id. at 138.
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Donor insemination or AID, however, is still regarded by
many as "an intrusion into the exclusivity and intimacy of
the conjugal bond that is hard to reconcile with the Christian
understanding of the nature of conjugal love."9 Yet, there is
clear evidence that couples who have successfully used AID
have enriched their personal and marital lives and that the
issue has not been "a painful reminder" of the husband's
impotency or infertility.20
Society is, perhaps, not ready to allow the re-shaping
and re-definition of the social, religious, ethical, and political
perspective in such a way as to allow condonation or valida-
tion of those acts that C. C. undertook in the previously
discussed saga of C. M. v. C. C. An enlightened judiciary can
go only so far.
So long as a re-thinking of religious perspective appears
not to be forthcoming, as it does here, a truly enlightened
society cannot be developed or promoted. Thus, if a van-
guard action of any nature is to be charted, it must not only
come from enlightened judicaries, but from legislatures as
well.
"1 Id. at 139.
2Id.
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